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This paper attempts to accurately model security requirements for computational grid environments
with particular focus on authentication. We introduce the Audited Credential Delegation (ACD)
architecture as a solution to some of the virtual organisations (VO) identity management usability
problems. The approach uses two complementary models: one is state based, described in Z no-
tation, and the other is event-based, expressed in the Process Algebra of Hoares Communicating
Sequential Processes (CSP). The former will be used to capture the state of the VO and to model
“back-end” operations on it whereas the latter will be used to model behavior, and in particular,
“front-end” interactions and communications. The modelling helps to clearly and precisely under-
stand functional and security requirements and provide a basis for verifying that the system meets its
intended requirements.
1 Introduction
The mission of a Virtual Organisation (VO) is to offer a simplified end user access to and use of high
performance computing resources shared across a number of different institutions with different admin-
istrative security domains. A typical example of a VO is the computational grid, which aims to provide
control over distributed resources consisting of enormous computational power (parallel processing ma-
chines), data storage (hard disks, memory) and visualisation on high speed networks. Examples of
currently operating grids include: the UK National Grid Service (NGS) [10] and US TeraGrid [14].
The sharing of these resources is intended to support academic research and industrial development. A
computational grid environment may consist of a mixture of several kinds of organisations including
academic, governmental, industrial and commercial institutions (will be referred to as “Sites” in this
paper).
One major problem faced by end-users and administrators of VOs is to do with the usability of the
security mechanisms usually deployed in these environments [4, 1], in particular identity management
solutions. Many of the existing computational grid environments use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
and X.509 digital certificates [6] as a corner stone for their security architectures. However, security
solutions based on PKI have to be usable to be effective. Some of the common grid identity management
encountered include: adding and removing users, acquiring and using digital certificates. End-users,
such as scientists who are not security experts, are concerned with the results of the computations they
perform on the grid. Many of the existing grid middleware, such as Globus and Unicore [4], require that
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the end-user creates a short lived certificate, known as proxy certificate, prior to running application on
the grid. In addition, many users engage in practices which weakens the security of the grid environment,
such as the sharing of the private key of a single personal certificate because acquiring certificates can be
a lengthy process [1].
We introduce the Audited Credential Delegation (ACD) architecture as a solution to some of the
above problems and we present a formal model of this architecture. The proposed solution carefully
hides the use of digital certificates from end-users and enables them to acquire credentials from their local
site administrators. It also enables the latter to to create/remove user accounts in a more efficient way.
A combination of state-based model, described in Z notation [15], and event-based model, expressed
in the Process Algebra of Hoares Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [5] is used to model the
architecture. Z is widely used in industry for modelling complex and large systems. It will be used
to capture the state of the VO components and to model “back-end” operations on it whereas the latter
will be used to model behavior, and in particular, “front-end” interactions and communications. Both
notations have clear and precise semantics. The Z descriptions in this work have been type checked with
ZTC tool. The modelling helps to clearly and precisely understand functional and security requirements
and provide a basis for verifying that the system meets its intended requirements. There are several
formal frameworks that combine state-based and event-based approaches and can also be used to have
a clear and concise model of this architecture, such as Circus in [8] and CSP‖B in [12]. Circus also
combines Z and CSP. In this work we are interested in modelling the VO architecture and the nature of Z
as a pure specification language [15], with a purer mathematical notation is therefore more appropriate
than VDM and B because they are more akin to conventional programming languages, and hence why
refinement into code is easier with these languages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the proposed
VO architecture. Section 3 and 4 present formal state-based models of the authentication components
followed by a CSP description of their pattern of interactions. Section 5 presents our conclusion.
2 Overview of Proposed Architecture
The physical infrastructure of this VO involves a separate administration site and a dedicate gateway
service, which is aimed at hiding digital certificates from end-user environment.
Figure 1: Audited Credential Delegation Architecture
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The gateway is responsible for identity management and consists of the following components: (1) Cre-
dential repository that stores certificates and their corresponding private keys in order to communicate
with the computational grid. It also maintains a list of active proxy certificates, their corresponding
privates key and an association between users and proxies. The main role of this component is to en-
able local site users to authenticate to external sites in the grid. (2) Local Authentication Service (LAS)
component that enables authenticating local site users within their organization using a locally provided
usable authentication mechanism rather than digital certificates. The LAS can support several types of
authentication mechanisms that scientists are used to such as Kerberos [7], Shibboleth [13] or a local
password database maintained at the gateway. End-users interact only with this component of the gate-
way. (3) An authorization component that controls requests issued from local site users to Grid resources.
In this paper the focus is on the local and external authentication components. The gateway will be inte-
grated with the Application Hosting Environment (AHE) [11], which allows scientists to run application
codes on grid resources; manage the transfer of files to and from the grid resources; and allow the user
to monitor the status of application instances that are run on the grid resources. This way it becomes
possible to identify legitimate users and to ensure that only those legitimate users are allowed access
to grid resources according to the policy defined on the grid projet. In this model, a scientist can login
locally using a username/password pair for the whole session and run applications on the grid via the
AHE server in a controlled manner. We are hoping to be able to deploy this solution within AHE for use
on TeraGrid, NGS and DEISA within the next 12 months.
3 VO Internal Authentication
The aim of this component is to enable end-user to authenticate locally using a username-password
mechanism. To be authenticated, a user must show knowledge of a valid username/password pair that
matches an entry in an authentication table, which can be a database or a password file. In this work,
a simple database password is considered for simplicity. In future work, Shibboleth and Kerberos can
also be used in the architecture. One of the techniques used for implementing this approach is to store
the hash of a salted password rather than the password itself in clear text. This way it is possible to
know that the user knows the correct password without ever having to store the original password on the
authentication server.
Figure 2: Local Database and Credential Repository that store digital Certificates, proxies and users’
credentials
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3.1 State-Based Model of the Local Authentication Component
Let UserID and Data be abstract types for denoting the set of all usernames, passwords and encrypted
passwords.
[UserID,Data]
State: The state of the local database authentication server comprises: a set of registered users; a partial
function pwdDB that associates each userID with one encrypted password; partial function that associates
each user with a salt; and a partial function encrypt that is used to encrypt/hash clear text passwords. The
invariant ensures that every registered user must have a password and that every user has an associated
salt. The model can be described in Z as follows:
DB LAS
registered users : PUserID pwdDB : UserID 7→ Data
salting : UserID 7→ Data encrypt : Data 7→ Data
registered users = dompwdDB ∧ dompwdDB = dom salting
Authentication Component Operations: The set of operations considered on this component are shown
in Figure 2. We only present the following operations on the DB LAS: Login, ChangePassword and
AddCredentialbecause of space limitation. For more details about this model the reader is referred to [3].
The operation Login takes a username and a password as inputs and checks whether the pair matches an
entry in the database. The operation is described in the following Z schema:
Login0
ΞDB LAS
username? : UserID pwd? : Data
encrypt(salting(username?)+pwd?) = pwdDB(username?)
The operation ChangePassword replaces the old password for the specified username with a new pass-
word after checking that the username and the old password supplied by a user matches an entry in the
database:
ChangePassword0
∆DB LAS
username? : UserID pwd? : Data newpwd? : Data newsalt?Data
encrypt(salting(username?)+pwd?) = pwdDB(username?) ∧
pwdDB′ = pwdDB⊕{username? 7→ encrypt(newsalt?+newpwd?)}
salting′ = salting⊕{username? 7→ newsalt?}
The AddCredential operation allows adding a new user to the database.
AddCredential0
∆DB LAS
username? : UserID pwd? : Data salt? : Data
pwdDB′ = pwdDB⊕{username? 7→ encrypt(salt?+pwd?)}
salting′ = salting⊕{username? 7→ salt?}
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Let Report be a data type, the values of which are messages indicating whether an operation has been
successful or has failed.
Report ::= Success | Failure
Precondition of each Operation: The precondition of the operations Login and ChangePassword is
that the username and password pair match an entry in the database. The precondition of the opera-
tion AddCredential is that the chosen username must not be already in use. The precondition for each
operation can be defined in Z as follows:
pre Login =̂ (username?,encrypt(salting(username?)+pwd?)) ∈ pwdDB
pre ChangePassword0 =̂ (username?,encrypt(salting(username?)+oldpwd?)) ∈ pwdDB
pre AddCredential0 =̂ username? /∈ dompwdDB
Totalizing: The totalising technique is used to handle errors resulting from not meeting the above pre-
conditions. An error may arise because the username doesn’t exist,
UserIDNotInUse
ΞDB LAS
username? : UserID athrep! : Report
username? /∈ dompwdDB ∧ athrep! = Failure
or the combination of username and password is wrong:
InvalidCredential
ΞDB LAS
username? : UserID pwd? : Data
authenticationdecision! : Report
¬ (encrypt(pwd?) = pwdDB(username?)) ∧ authenticationdecision! = Failure
A successful operation will result in the same report:
Op Success
authenticationdecision! : Report
authenticationdecision! = Success
The Authentication component’s operations will then be modeled as follows:
Login =̂ (Login0 ∧ Op Success) ∨ InvalidCredential
ChangePassword =̂ (ChangePassword0 ∧ Op Success) ∨UserIDNotInUse ∨ InvalidCredential
AddCredential =̂ (AddCredential0 ∧Op Success) ∨ UserIDInUse
Initialization: The initial state of the authentication server component is described as follows:
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DB LASInit
AuthenticationCredential′
registered users′ = {ali,mark, john}
pwdDB′ = {(ali,6f 8cac5b994687f 7a05619c3324fbc5e),
(mark,8d137ac4eec0df 89f 089540ac19ac99c),(john,a4375b7cc7511652d0029cbffff 4269)}
In this initialization, the hashes of the passwords are generated using MD5 hash [9]. The username/password
pairs memorized by the users are: (ali,pwdx),(mark,mrk3000),(john,wnd1980)
3.2 Modelling the User
The model of a user focuses primarily on the security knowledge that the user must possess and maintain
for the purpose of authentication. The abstract state of a user, User, comprises three components: (1)
u names, set of usernames held by the user (also known as principal); and (2) u password, a function
that associates each principal with a plain password. The state of a user can be formulated in Z as follows:
User
u names : PUserID u password : UserID 7→ Data
domu password = u names
The invariant states that each username has exactly one password.
3.3 Event-Based Model of the Local Authentication Component
We derive the CSP interface of the authentication server from the Z specification. This description has
been structured as follows:
• State = DB LAS.
• Operations = {Login , ChangePassword, ResetPassword, AddCredential,RemoveCredential,Logout}.
• Preconditions of each operation. For instance, for the login operation:
Login: (username?,encrypt(salting(username?)+pwd?)) ∈ pwdDB
• Initial WS state = DB LASInit, totalizing the operations and adding reports to handle incorrect
inputs.
The interface of the authentication server is:
αDB = {Login,LoginRequest,LoginResponse,ChangePassword,ChangePasswordRequest,
ChangePasswordResponse,ResetPassword,ResetPasswordRequest,ResetPasswordResponse,
AddCredential,AddCredentialRequest,AddCredentialResponse,RemoveCredential,
RemoveCredentialRequest,RemoveCredentialResponse,Logout,LogoutRequest,LogoutResponse}
The behaviour of the authentication server is modelled by the CSP process DB shown below. The de-
scription doesn’t consider the pattern of interactions corresponding to the operations ResetPassword,
RemoveCredential and AddCredential, because this depends on the role of the authenticated user. For
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example, only an authenticated user holding an administrator role can add/remove other users and reset
passwords.
DB(State) = LOGIN(state)
LOGIN(state) = Login → LoginRequest?(username?,pwd?) →
(LoginResponse!(authenticationdecision!! ❀ Success)
→ AUTH(u) <| pre Login(username?,pwd?) |>
LoginResponse!(authenticationdecision! ❀ Failure)→ DB((state)))
AUTH(u) = CHGPWD(state) ✷ LOGOUT(state)
CHGPWD(state) = ChangePassword →
ChangePasswordRequest?(username?,oldpwd?,newpwd?) →
(ChangePasswordResponse!(athrep! ❀ Success)→
AS(state′) <| pre ChangePassword(username?,oldpwd?,newpwd?) |>
ChangePasswordResponse!(athrep! ❀ Failure)→ AUTH(u))
LOGOUT(state) = Logout → LogoutRequest?(username?) →
(LogoutResponse!(athrep! ❀ Failure)→ AS(state′) <| pre Logout(username?) |>
LogoutResponse!(athrep! ❀ Failure)→ DB(state))
Figure 3: Client and Database Server models
So for example, a user with a valid username and password, say ali and pwdx respectively, can be
authenticated by the server by issuing the following sequence of interactions:
CLIENT1 = DoLogin → DoLoginRequest!(username? ❀ ali,pwd?❀ 6f ....fbc5e)
→ DoLoginResponse?authenticationdecision! → SKIP
where encrypt(pwdx) = 6f 8cac5b994687f 7a05619c3324fbc5e.
The CSP operator [+Op+] models the interaction between two processes in which the handshake is
on the operation Op. Both processes synchronize on the channel Op. The input values flows from
the requestor to the provider and the output values flows in the opposite direction. For instance, the
result of CLIENT1 sequence of interactions with the authentication server is calculated using a parallel
composition of CLIENT1 and AS processes as follows:
DB(state)[+Login+]CLIENT1 = Login →
LoginRequest!(username? ❀ ali,pwd?❀ 6f 8cac5b994687f 7a05619c3324fbc5e)
LoginResponse!(authenticationdecision! ❀ Success)→ DB(state′)
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Figure 4: Client and Database handshake on Login Operation
4 VO External Authentication
The credential repository is used to store digital certificates or proxy certificates for named grid projects
and resources and their corresponding private keys to enable communication with the grid. These certifi-
cates will be shared by a group of users and will be used to create proxy certificates.
4.1 State-Based Model of the External Authentication Component
The model assumes the existence of the following types:
[UserID,Subject,Data,Key,serialNb,CipherAlgName,CertAuthorityName]
The state of the certificate repository comprises: a set of certificates; a set of project and resources names;
a partial function key association that associates each Certificate with it’s corresponding private key; a
partial function cert association that is used to associate each project with a digital certificate; a list of
issued proxies certificates created using the digital certificates, the proxies secret keys, association be-
tween each proxy and the user who generated it.
CredentialRepository
certificates : PCertificate proxyCertificates : PCertificate
projectsNames : PName resourcesNames : PName
key association : SerialNb ↔ Key cert association : Name 7→ SerialNb
issuedproxies : SerialNb 7→ SerialNb proxyIssuer : SerialNb 7→ SerialNb
proxySecretKey : SerialNb 7→ Key userProxy : SerialNb 7→ UserID
∀c : Certificate • c ∈ certificates ∧ c.serial ∈ domkey association ∧
rancert association ⊆ domkey association ∧
domcert association ⊆ projectsNames ∧
domcert association ⊆ resourcessNames ∧
∀c : Certificate • c ∈ proxyCertificates ∧ c.serial ∈ domproxySecretKey ∧
domproxySecretKey = domproxyIssuer = domuserProxy
Where proxyCertificates is the set of all active proxies; issuedproxies, a function that relates a serial num-
ber to a proxy certificate; proxyIssuer, a function that relates the proxy certificate with its issuer (signer)
identified by a public certificate; userProxy, a function that associates a user in a site with the proxy
certificate in a unique way; proxySecretKey, a function that associates each proxy with its corresponding
private key. More details on modelling PKI component in Z and CSP are presented in [2].The same
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approach as in the previous section can be applied to model operations. For instance, the administrative
operation on the CredentialRepository, AddCertificate, takes a certificate, its corresponding private key,
and the project with which it can be used as inputs. The precondition for this operation to succeed states
that the cert? should not already be in the list of certificates. The operation is captured in Z as follows:
AddCertificate0
∆CredentialRepository
cert? : Certificate secretkey? : Key project? : Name
response! : Report
cert!.publicKey validPKIKeyPair secretKey? ∧
cert? /∈ certificates ∧ certificates′ = certificates∪{cert?} ∧
key association′ = key association∪{(cert?.serial,secretkey?)} ∧
cert association′ = cert association⊕{project? 7→ cert?.serial}
The operation RemoveCertificate takes a certificate as an argument and removes it with its correspond-
ing secret key from the credential repository. The precondition states that the cert? must exists in the
certificates set.
RemoveCertificate0
∆CredentialRepository
cert? : Certificate
cert? ∈ certificates ∧ certificates′ = certificates\{cert?} ∧
key association′ = {cert?.serial}−⊳ key association ∧
cert association′ = cert association−⊲ {cert?.serial}
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a formal model of a VO architecture that combines PKI and username-
password mechanisms in order to provide a usable security solution for VO end-users. The model uses
a combination of state-based and event-based approach. The consistency of Z model is checked with
the ZTC tool. The formalism has clarified the purpose of the VO, the explicit assumptions about sites,
users, CAs and third parties. The observation of the states enables to easily know the current capabilities
of the user, site and the VO. For instance, it becomes clear from the model of the user that he/she will
have to maintain only one identity to authenticate to the gateway. Also, it makes it possible to find a user
responsible for performing a task on the grid. This allows local sites and the entity running the gateway
to monitor who access resources for auditing and billing purposes. Most importantly, we have linked the
CSP model with the Z specification in a systematic way. We derive the CSP interface of the VO from the
Z state, operations, precondition on each operation and initial state.
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